Chapter Two

The Basis of Heidegger’s Atheism

Heidegger’s Relation to Christian Theology

I have already indicated that Heidegger asserts the atheism of philosophy very early on in his work, as least as early as 1921, and that this atheism is profoundly connected with the Christian God. Nevertheless, Vincent Vycinas notes in *Earth and Gods* that “Heidegger does not encounter God in the Christian sense” and concludes his penetrating study of Heidegger’s understanding of world with an appendix entitled *Heidegger and Christianity*.¹ Vycinas adds “the fact of such non-encountering is not a judgement against the existence of God. Neither is it a testimony for Him in the explicit sense: ‘Philosophy is a finite assertion of man and not the voice of God’”.² This is correct, in that it explains the position Heidegger himself takes up with regard to God and theology, and most particularly Christian theology.

Heidegger’s biographical origins in and separation from theology have been extensively researched.³ Both Rüdiger Safranski and Hugo Ott have drawn attention to Heidegger’s Catholic upbringing and his willingness to take up conservative positions, not so much because of any fanaticism, but, as Safranski notes, simply because Catholicism

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was part of the stuff and makeup of his and his family’s life. 4 Safranski notes that Heidegger’s admission to the Catholic seminary (to train as a priest) in the Schwabian town of Konstanz in 1903 began a financial dependency on Catholic sources that continued until the completion of his formal education in 1916, with the publication of his Habilitationsschrift. 5 What has perhaps sometimes been overlooked is Heidegger’s deep knowledge of the texts central to the neo-Scholasticism which formed so much a part of a German Catholic seminary education in the early years of the twentieth century. Heidegger would have been familiar with the texts of Aquinas—in particular the two Summas and the Quaestiones Disputatae: de Veritate, as well as Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Physics, Nicomachean Ethics, and de Anima. It is clear from his earlier (Marburg) lecture courses in particular that he was also familiar with the work of Augustine, Anselm, Eckhart, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Occam, as well as Bernard of Clairvaux, Suárez, and other figures formative of the Scholastic tradition. Bultmann is said to have described Heidegger (during his time at Marburg) as “our foremost Luther man”.

Safranski adds that “what fascinates [Heidegger] about theology is not the theological but the philosophical aspect”, and indeed, Heidegger records in 1913 that his lectures in theology had driven him to conduct his own readings of the scholastics, because the philosophical training available to him failed to give him what he sought. 6 Despite Ott’s attempts to locate Heidegger’s break from formal Catholicism in political intrigues around his failure to secure a senior academic post, it is clear from what he writes (and Ott’s liberal citations of Heidegger’s correspondence with his friend Laslowski), that Heidegger was already, even by 1913, questioning the neo-Scholasticism that was then current as the interpretative access to the earlier texts. 7

Writing of this period later (in 1922), Heidegger observed that with the beginning of his activity as a teacher, it became impossible for him to undertake philosophical research while remaining bound to a Catholic faith. 8 Safranski’s conclusion is surely correct: that what mattered in all of Heidegger’s theological concerns was the engagement with philosophy. Theology was a way into philosophical research. Ted Sadler, Thomas Sheehan, Theodor Kisiel, and John van Buren have all conducted extensive research into how Heidegger’s early lectures on religion and in particular how the ‘kaiological time’ of early Christian communities actually pointed him in the direction of a description of human being which enabled him to develop a critique of Aristotelian ontology, demonstrating the degree to which it also was only possible on the basis of an understanding of being which remained undisclosed.

Sadler is not wrong to see in this an earlier form of “what [Heidegger] will later call ‘Seinsvergessenheit’”. 9 Sadler draws attention to Karl Lehmann’s essay on the younger Heidegger’s work and its concern with Christian themes, although he misses the crucial point, omitting to mention that it is Lehmann’s stress on the originary Christian experience of history—that history at any moment is subject to its own end through Christ’s second

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4. See Safranski, R., Ein Meister aus Deutschland (1997), p. 23. For examples of Heidegger’s early conservative positions, see in particular the various short writings and book reviews published as chapters 1, 5, 6, 9, and 10, in Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (GA16).


7. See Ott, H., Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie, esp. pp. 81–95. Ott quotes on p. 90 a letter from Laslowski which counsels Heidegger in 1915, in the run-up to a professorial appointment that he failed to attain, saying: “Please be careful especially now, in what you say about scholasticism” (author’s italics). Indeed, Ott’s charge of opportunism as Heidegger’s motive for receiving financial support from Catholic sources only succeeds if, as Safranski supposes, Heidegger had entertained doubts about the direction of Catholic scholarship since at least 1913. The school of interpretation that was emerging in Catholic circles was driven by ideological concerns: Leo XIII had restored the place of Aquinas in Catholic thought in 1873 with the publication of his Encyclical Letter Aeterni Patris, and Pius X had in 1907 issued the condemnation of Modernism in the Encyclical Letter Pascendi. What emerged from this taut intellectual engagement with the modern world and simultaneous recovery of medieval sources was a systematization of thought, a neo-Scholasticism, that was itself unwitting prey to all the forces it was resisting.


coming—that enables the earliest Christian communities to have a unique access to the question concerning the meaning of being. Lehmann compares this to the Aristotelian ontology by saying: “The experience of the original-Christian understanding of history is perhaps the only possible ‘standpoint’ from which the limitation of the former ontology in its understanding of the meaning of being and also the persistence of this limitation could stand out”.10 This makes the reference to the forgetfulness of being the more prescient—this forgetfulness is not just a feature of time, it is what the history of being is. Sadler points out that after 1921 Heidegger moved beyond these earliest Christian links with the question of being: “He came to think of this as too restrictive a context in which to situate his ontological enquiries, and as too susceptible to misinterpretations along doctrinal lines”.11 Nevertheless, it is a persistent concern with going back into the roots of the Christian experience itself which provides the basis for a philosophical critique of the whole history of ontology.

It is worth noting in connection with this research Hugo Ott’s emphatic view that (interpreting some remarks of Heidegger’s made to a private circle in 1954) throughout, the God with whom Heidegger is concerned is “definitely the Christian God”.12 My own argument is an attempt to demonstrate philosophically the truth of what for Ott is a statement made in the light of his (strictly speaking) historiographical research. On the other hand, Ott is keen to remind us of Heidegger’s strongly felt and expressed antipartheism, with the implication that it has a significance for his atheistic philosophical work. Ott misses the point of what Heidegger’s atheism is about.13 This atheism is an address in the wake of Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God, a way of taking up a position with regard to the whole of the history of Western philosophy and the way in which it has articulated God, both Christian and before Christ. Heidegger’s own view, his refusal to undertake a theology, is part of this address, not (as indeed Vycinas tells us) because he either has or does not have a view on faith or belief, but because his address springs from a strictly philosophical motive. Philosophy has nothing to say of the Christian God—which means that Heidegger’s discus-

The charge has been made that Heidegger’s use of terms like fallenness15 and guilt16 (following comments of Karl Löwith’s that we will examine later) suggest that it is possible to interpret the language of Sein und Zeit as a masked Christian theology.17 Fergus Kerr repeats the charge when he says “Heidegger’s attitude to Christian theology, hostile at one level, overtly and explicitly so, attributing the monstrous invention of the transcendental subject to Christian theology, is also proprietorial, indeed exploitative of and even parasitical upon Christian theology”.18 He concludes “it may be said, without much exaggeration, that almost every philosophical innovation in Sein und Zeit may easily be traced to a theological source”.19 Immediately the difficulties in reading Heidegger become clear. For Heidegger, the question is not whether he has interpretatively and imaginatively

15. Verfallenheit. Cf., for an earlier working out of this term in particular, the section entitled Ruinanz in Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (GA61), esp. p. 155. Here Ruinanz is understood as a decline (Verfall) into an objectifying (Objektivierung).
17. Löwith makes this point on more than one occasion, but in particular he suggests: “Heideggers existenziale Ontologie ist weder imstande, die Naturphilosophie der Antike zurückzuführen, noch kann sie auf die christliche Spaltung eines geborenen und wiedergeborenen Menschen, eines ‘eigentlichen’ und ‘uneigentlichen’ Daseins verzichten” (M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig [1984], p. 84). The extent to which such a reading of Eigentlichkeit is unwarranted will, I hope, become clear in what follows concerning coming to my-self.
internalized a Christian theology which is now reproduced in philosophical form—indeed that is (loosely described) his very charge against metaphysics, as we shall see. Rather, the question is, what is the ontological basis for these ontic descriptions of matters of Christian faith? This is a philosophical question that concerns itself with theology. Heidegger is proceeding back through Christian belief and the Christianization of God to ask how philosophy actually is, and can in the future remain, the ontological basis for an understanding of human being worked out on the basis of faith. Löwith and Kerr entirely miss the point: if Christianity is to speak truly of human being, even though it speaks only after God has spoken, what it speaks of must have a basis in the world. Otherwise the contents of Christian doctrine, having no ontological basis (not, in other words, being an address to human being which can be heard by humans and recognized by them as such), would simply be an imaginative fancy. As we shall see, this is no more than what he actually says in his 1927 lecture “Phänomenologie und Theologie”. 20

Hans-Georg Gadamer reports Heidegger speaking in a group of theologians in Marburg in the early 1920s on the task of theology: “After evoking the Christian scepticism of Franz Overbeck, he said it was the true task of theology, to which it must again find its way back, to seek the word which is capable of calling to faith and keeping in faith”. 21 It was, Gadamer notes, a pure Heidegger-sentence, full of ambiguousness. He adds that this sentence was only fulfilled in the later “talk about the turn” where he says that “the call to faith, the summons that challenged the self-sufficiency of the ‘I’ and made it necessary that the ‘I’ become an issue for itself in faith is to be found”. 22

Heidegger’s concern with philosophy over theology does not mean he privileges philosophy over theology in general, but rather that he saw it as his own task to think philosophically. This task commits him to a methodological atheism, precisely because it indicates the extent to which the Christianization of God has subsumed philosophy under Christian doctrine, above all the doctrine of the ens creatum. Kerr has already indicated where this concern is most centrally located, both for Heidegger and for modern metaphysics generally: in the working out of the meaning of the ‘I’, the self. For modern metaphysics, exactly as Kerr notes, the self is worked out through the cogito of Descartes and the transcendental subject of German Idealism. For Heidegger, the self is worked out through the phenomenological description of Dasein.

Heidegger’s Critique of the Subject of Metaphysics

What is the relationship between subjectivity and the ens creatum? In speaking of the Greek understanding of human being, Heidegger always reminds his reader that the Greeks understood the human being uniquely as the ζωὸν λόγον ἐχον, the being that has language. This having language is speaking, λέγειν, which is the basis for human beings’ concern with truth, αλήθεια. Αλήθεια means “to be disclosing, to remove the world from concealedness and coveredness”. 23 Speaking, therefore, is concerned with world, so that the human being is both “in the sphere of other existing beings (Daseienden) with it in the mode of living (plants, animals) and indeed as a being which has language (λόγον ἐχον), which addresses and discusses its world . . . its concern in the wider sense”. 24 This understanding of Dasein’s being in the world undergoes a transformation in the development of what Heidegger calls Christian Dasein, in the developments of the medieval period. At the same time the translation of ζωὸν λόγον ἐχον from Greek thought into the Latin mentality which understands human being as animal rationale means that the original Greek sense is lost. Humanity is now understood strictly in terms of the ratio, reason, rather than speaking. It becomes a theological definition, determined out of biblical revelation. Heidegger says: “The guide taken from this is Genesis Chapter One, verse twenty-six, ‘and God said, Let us make man according to our image and likeness’. Humanity is, according to the measure of faith, predetermined

24. Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) (GA6), p. 27. “. . . im Umkreis von anderem mit ihm in der Weise des Lebens Daseienden (Pflanzen, Tiere), und zwar als ein Seiendes, das Sprache hat (λόγον ἐχον), seine Welt anspricht und bespricht; seine Welt . . . des Besorgens im weiteren Sinne” (author’s italics).
as being-created in God’s image”. The effect of this is that the essence of what it is to be human is made entirely dependent on God as such, something which is added to the Greek definition. The meaning of ζων λογον εχων therefore undergoes a multiplicity of changes while appearing to say the same thing. The ratio of speaking, λεγειν, becomes the ratio Dei of medieval thought. From being determined out of the condition of its being with other beings (this is what speaking is), human being is now determined out of its foundation on God. Heidegger makes the same point in Sein und Zeit, noting, however, that “the Christian definition in modern times becomes de-theologized”.

The same process occurs both for the world, which is transformed from Aristotle’s view that it is eternal to the Christian concern that “in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth”, and for God as well, in that the ancient ontology is also used to work out the Christian understanding of God, and so “the being of God becomes interpreted ontologically”.

When, therefore, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger sets out to demonstrate the way Descartes transforms the interpretation of world in the inception of modern metaphysics, he notes that “the considerations which follow will not have been grounded in full detail until the ‘cogito sum’ has been phenomenologically destructured”. The text points to the section of Sein und Zeit which was never published.

What concerns me in this discussion is not Heidegger’s analysis of the way in which the consequence for understanding world is transformed by Descartes from Aristotle’s place (τὸ πός) into geometrical, spatial, res extensa

(an important enough subject in itself). Rather, the question is how what Heidegger calls the Christianization of God becomes the basis for a fundamental redescription of human being. The persistent question has remained whether Descartes himself was an atheist. Zbigniew Janowski has shown in detail that Descartes’s fundamental motive and impulse were exactly the same as that also identified by Heidegger (although he makes no reference to Heidegger’s work). In emphasizing the novelty of Descartes’s work and its freedom from antecedents, Janowski says “for Descartes the question is... is there anything that does not depend on God?... Descartes’ [question] is about the ontological relation between God and the creation”. In the determination of human being, Janowski shows how the ontological dependence of humanity on God is worked out through the human being’s likeness to God.

Heidegger indicates, but does not discuss in detail, the way in which Descartes, having established the cogito, asks ‘whether there be a God’ and what character such God might have. Descartes concludes: “By the term ‘God’ I understand a substance: a substance infinite, independent, most highly intelligent, most highly powerful, and which both I myself and everything else that is extant—if indeed something else is extant—have been created.”

Two things are significant about what Descartes says. First, Descartes invokes the divine names (as indeed he does elsewhere) precisely in order to establish the priority of God. God is infinite substance as opposed to human finite substance, although, as Heidegger notes, this leaves the question of the meaning of substance unclarified in Descartes. This has the effect that “being itself does not ‘affect’ us, and therefore cannot be interrogated. ‘Being is not a real predicate’ according to a remark of Kant’s, who is only repeating Descartes’ principle”. In this sense, what Descartes carries through with regard to metaphysics is both further grounded and established by Kant.

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27. Genesis 1:1.


32. Descartes, R., Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (Descartes, VII, 1996), p. 45. (Third meditation) “Dei nomine intelligo substantiam quandam infinitam, independentem, summe intelligentem, summe potentem et a quâ tum ego ipse, tum aliud omne, si quid aliud extat, quodcumque extat, est creatum.”


34. Descartes, R., Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (Descartes, VII, 1996), p. 36. (Third meditation) “Dei nomine intelligo substantiam quandam infinitam, independentem, summe intelligentem, summe potentem et a quâ tum ego ipse, tum aliud omne, si quid aliud extat, quodcumque extat, est creatum.”

Second, a double temporal movement in the order of being is inaugurated with regard to God, a movement that nevertheless lies hardly recognized or explicated in Descartes’s commentators. Descartes establishes the ‘I’ of the cogito as the first indubitable thing the self may know. In so doing, the cogito comes to something of which it may be even more certain—not because there are degrees in the order of certainty, but because of a certain priority with regard to time. God is discovered subsequent to the establishment of the self but is discovered in the manner of already needing to have been, in order to be the indubitable cause of the self and everything else that is (insofar as it is). God already is, but this is dependent on my knowing in virtue of who I am.

The important point here is that this is the temporal mode of procedure of faith: I come to believe in a God who (in faith, I discover) first gave me to be. However, the proper temporal priority of faith is transposed improperly to the order of being, of philosophy itself, so that God lies at the origin as the philosophically accessible cause of all things, in virtue of the structure of the self, the subject. This priority of God as most real being and the creator and cause of all things is precisely the understanding which Heidegger’s atheism is intended to destructure. Heidegger describes this move in the following way: “Modern philosophy made a total turnabout of philosophical inquiry and started out from the subject, the I”.36

This word—turnabout (Umwendung)—will be critical in understanding Heidegger’s entire philosophical work. Yet this turnabout already proves to be entirely in consequence of the Christianization of God. It is necessary, therefore, to see the intimate connection between Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity and his methodological atheism. In order to do this, I want to sketch, albeit briefly, four moments in the phenomenological description of Dasein from the period prior and immediately subsequent to the publication of Sein und Zeit: first, the existential analytic of Dasein; second, the hermeneutics of facticity; third, the worlding of world; and fourth, the nothing as the ground of interpretation, which itself is an abyss or no ground at all. In each case it is possible to see how the analytic of Dasein is worked out in relation and opposition to Descartes’s subject.

Understanding what coming to the self means arises from considering the questionableness that opens the project of Sein und Zeit and Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity. This will allow the turn, or turnabout, to be elaborated in relation to Heidegger’s own understanding of die Kehre in chapters 3 and 4.

The Phenomenological Description of Dasein

In chapter 1 I noted how, in connection with Bultmann’s failure to problematize Heidegger’s thinking, being-interpretative might function as a name for Dasein. To understand how this already might be the case by the time of Heidegger’s involvement with Bultmann in Marburg in the 1920s, it is necessary to understand how the facticity of Dasein as such and Dasein as self-questioning is precisely established as what Heidegger calls atheism. István Fehér suggests that Heidegger’s fundamental perspective can be understood to have arisen out of his continual inquiry into what philosophy actually is.37 This very inquiry brings questionableness to the fore, so that Heidegger says “thrust within absolute questionableness and thus seeing, to have it, that’s what’s really grasping philosophy”.38

What Heidegger names in Sein und Zeit and elsewhere as the existential analytic of Dasein is the multiplicity of structures in which, through questioning as the very approach and procedure for doing so, Dasein comes to an understanding of its character as existing.39 This questioning, as a placing of the ‘I’ into question, is the means whereby the ontological difference is brought to light:

If the questioning is genuine, then it has to be adequate to what it asks for, to the degree that this is possible. The questioning must therefore rightly understand what it asks when it asks about being. What it asks for here as such refers back to the very questioning, inasmuch as this questioning is a being. In asking about being, however, we do not raise the question of the being of the being which the questioning itself is;


but we do satisfy the sense of the question of being when we first uncover the questioning as a being simply in what it is . . . as what is this being, of which we say that it questions, looks upon, considers as, relates, etc.—already given? It is *that* being which we ourselves are; this being, which I myself am in each particular instance, we call the *Dasein*. 40

*Dasein* is therefore the place of the ontological difference: “To grasp the understanding of being means to understand *that* being to whose being-constituted the understanding of being belongs, *Dasein*. 41 The whole force of this explication of the structural analytic of *Dasein* is, however, to unfold the structures of *Dasein* as that being for whom world worlds. It is, in other words, a radical critique of any attempt to represent a transcendental structure of subjectivity—it is the critique of subjectivity as such (indeed, it is elaborated specifically as a critique of Kant and Husserl). 42 In a 1925 lecture course Heidegger stresses the fact that “*Dasein* . . . is . . . not a subject or con-

40. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (GA20), p. 199 f. “Wenn das Fragen echtes ist, dann hat es möglichst seinem Erfragen angemessen zu sein, d.h. das Fragen muß recht verstehen, was es fragt, nach dem Sein nämlichs. Das Erfrage schlägt hier als dieses Erfrage auf das Fragen selbst zurück, sofern dieses ein Seiendes ist. Aber im Fragen nach dem Sein stellen wir nicht die Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden, das das diese Erfrage in Frage nach dem Sein, wenn wir das Fragen als Seiendes zunächst lediglich in dem, was es ist, aufdecken . . . Als was ist dieses Seiende, von dem wir sagen: fragen, hinsehen auf, ansprechen als, beziehen—vorgegeben? Es ist das Seiende das wir selbst sind; dieses Seiende, das ich je selbst bin, nennen wir das *Dasein*” (author’s italics).


42. The sharpness of this critique cannot be underestimated. In *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (GA20), §4, 8, Heidegger concludes by elaborating a point against Husserl he will repeat in 1937 concerning any attempt to establish a universal theory of knowledge. It is, he argues, simply not possible to deduce a universal knowledge which could then subsequently be passed on, perhaps pedagogically, without having been primarily or originally experienced by those who will receive it. Why this should be I will examine in full later. Heidegger says (*Grundfragen der Philosophie* [GA45], p. 87): “The knowledge of the essence, therefore, if it is to be shared, must itself be accomplished anew by the one who is to assume it. More precisely, it cannot be communicated in the sense of the passing on of a proposition, whose content is simply grasped without its foundation and its acquisition being accomplished again.” (*Die Wesenserkennnis* muß daher—soll sie zur Mitteilung kommen—von dem, der sie aufnehmen soll, selbst

43. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (GA20), §12, p. 422. “*Dasein* . . . ist . . . nicht ein Subjekt oder Bewußtsein, das sich gelegentlich erst eine Welt zulegt” (author’s italics).

44. Heidegger—*Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (1984), pp. 148–154. In particular, Löwith argues that the later Heidegger abandons the “subiectival, *Dasein*-oriented foundation of truth” (“subjekthafte, daseinsmäßige Fundament der Wahrheit”) of *Sein und Zeit* (p. 148) and speaks of Heidegger’s attempt to speak of being without “subiectivity as the point of departure” (“Aussagensstellung bei der Subjektivität”) (p. 151).

The Hermeneutics of Facticity

What preceded the elaboration of the analytic of Dasein in the period between 1919 and 1924 was the thoroughgoing working out of the hermeneutics of facticity, exemplified in a lecture course of 1923 entitled Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität). Here in the Supplement, Heidegger raises the notion of destructuring which in itself is the hermeneutics of facticity. Destructuring will be “a penetrating, dismantling, going-back to the motive-sources of explication”. This will reveal the “hidden motives” which drive the ruling interpretations that have precisely taken over and formed a world independent of my being through the structures of subjectivity, and so left me as alienated from what world is. Even earlier than this in 1922, Heidegger had stressed that philosophy’s ability to explicate the fundamental movements of life itself: its capacity “to make factual life speak for itself on the basis of its own factual possibilities” only if it is “fundamentally atheistic”. Fehér notes that in the course of elaborating the character of the hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger demonstrates that “the present is . . . thoroughly permeated and dominated by traditional conceptual schemes, dragged along through the centuries without any effort at an original re-appropriation—conceptual schemes and habits whose roots in lived experience, from which they once emerged, have long withered away”. Destructuring actually brings the tradition before me in an entirely new way, for it forces me to question its reception and interrogate it into its very roots—to know it, precisely in order to understand and so overcome it. To overcome—a term I shall use often—does not mean to exceed, but rather to bring before the self and stand within whatever is overcome for its own sake, properly. Such an interrogation reveals the very lived-experience of its origins, in that in order to be able to interrogate it with regard to its roots means already to understand that what now are the shards and hints of meaning once were the very stuff of interpretation; they were the very material of the common expression of lived-experience. Again, such a lived-experience presupposes a world—just that world which, as lived-experience worlded Dasein, but which has since been covered over and forgotten. In the covering over and forgetting, what gets left behind are objectifications that in their turn take over as markers for an experience that is no longer available to be articulated.

To undergo the separation from the lived-experience that produced an interpretative way of being reproduces the world as objects. Such a reproduction at the same time displaces me from standing in the worlding of lived experience: I come now to be explained as the subject who knows the objects of a world in which I no longer live. The worlding of world becomes so many objects (objectifications) against which a subject is made to stand. Hence Heidegger’s concern with objects—literally objects, things that stand against (the German is Gegenstand), displacing me from where I would stand to be in lived experience. Heidegger analyzes this decay of meaning as, for instance, in the epistemology of the theoretical sciences, a “demand for a standpoint-free observing” which is itself in consequence of the coming about of the subject-object distinction.

The Worlding of World

This working through of Dasein reveals it as that being who, through a factual, worlded hermeneutics and explication of the meaning of lived experience, in its very structures, in being worlded, occurs as an abyss, an ungrounded being, and so not originally caused by God in the order of being. Heidegger indicates that this being ungrounded is the very constitution of Dasein’s freedom. Dasein would, for instance, be free to discover itself (through God’s revelation, in faith) as caused by God precisely and only because its originary freedom is that it discovers itself in its world as ungrounded by anything other than its being in the world ontologically. However, this freedom brings with it attendant dangers, dangers which are part of the structure of Dasein and of its freedom. The question of meaning

46. Ontologie (GA63), a Freiburg lecture course of the summer semester of 1923, p. 106. The point is repeated in Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (1922/23), p. 249. The notion of Destruktion appears as early as the Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Wegmarken [GA9]), p. 3E.


is posed for Dasein precisely because meaning is not given in advance of (i.e., prior to) Dasein, but Dasein has to advance toward what meaning is: Dasein must discover meaning for itself and make it its own. This advancing-toward is a temporal phenomenon.

In the phenomenology of Ruinance that Heidegger explicated in lectures in 1921 and 1922, he defines the whither of ruinance precisely as the nothing. The consequence of this coming to the self as worlded, through factical interpretation, is that in lived experience there is always an undergoing of the loss of meaning. This is what ruinance is and how it occurs. Ruinance is the passing of time, or ‘timing’ of factical, lived, existing, as the taking away of that sense of time which would otherwise reveal that the separation of meaning was taking place from its lived roots or origins. In other words, ruinance is a forgetting, a decay which, in decaying, destroys even the remembrance of its occurring, so that it renders what it destroys invisible, and it renders itself invisible at the same time: “Factual, ruined, living ‘has no time’, because its basic movement, ruinance itself, takes away ‘time’, an erased time which as itself factically ruined living in itself erases. Ruinance erases time, which means that it seeks to delete the historical from out of facticity.” Ruinance is, in a sense, the forgetting that belongs to being-factical. To be factual is to be finite in a world. To be worlded means to be gaining and erasing, and so being worlded has a driven aspect which in its very negating allows a driving-forward, but as a being-driven into the impersonal and the static realities of the impersonal das Man that is no one or nobody in particular; the anonymous. Ruinance disembodies me as something whose lived experience is subordinated to the objectifications of meaning in ruinance.

How can this be? Which is to ask, how can ruinance, which is timely, have no time and yet can only be understood as a phenomenon which is concerned with time? This may be explained in two ways. First, in that Dasein is something I know myself to be, I move in time by an orientation toward the future which may include the past as a remembering of it, or as a forgetting. My existence is, however, altered by my experience of time whether I remember or forget, and in this sense I still change, whether in moving I know it and can explain it, or not. My projecting forward into a future is not something I will as such, but rather is how I could even know myself at all, how I could have the view that driving forward is the driving of my will. I am driven into the future because the present, through ruinance, decays into the past and leaves me with an absence, a nothing, which demands to be filled. Ruinance gives the semblance of being overcome only when I enter into the reflection on my timeliness as such. I take up the future as existing, which is also always a certain laying aside of the past in order to take up the future. I can be aware of ruinance or not, but even becoming aware of ruinance implies a certain taking hold of it in a particular way, a ‘how’ of bringing it to the fore. Whether I take hold or not, ruinance occurs. In taking hold in a particular way, everything that is not taken in in this taking hold is itself lost to ruinance, so that memory itself takes form as a particular memory, as this memory, which is not (but could have been) that memory.

The second sense has to do, not with my Dasein as constituted as mine, but as its being-constituted: what I take up in order to understand my taking up; what I take for granted, in that it explains all the taking-up of the future I do. This is the very possibility of my knowing that I am oriented toward the future, as a knowing that also contains a lag, a stretching out (intentio) as a space for reflecting or failing to reflect in being timed. Ruinance has no time because it is my losing of myself, and I am timely.

The Nothing as the Ground of Interpretation

There is then a negating in ruinance which allows life to be as such, but which is always alienative. Heidegger describes this as a drop or crash. Where does ruinance end up—where does it plunge down into? Nowhere—it is its own whither. The erasing and negating is revealed in its very negating-character as the nothing. Finally, Heidegger concludes, the nothing of facticity as such is “of and for itself timely enlivening environing not coming to the fore in ruinance of existence itself (facticity)”. Nothing itself is structural to facticity.

In 1921–22 Heidegger uses the phrase ‘the empty’ to illustrate the sense of nothing in factical life. It is this emtpiness and nothing-character which constitutes “the how of ‘yet existing’” which he had already pointed out was the very Da- of “Da-sein of facticity”. It is only a short step, therefore, from this factical explication of ‘ruinance’ to describing the very freedom of Dasein as an abyss in the essay Vom Wesen des Grundes in 1929.

Negation as such is the very actuality of Dasein as both finite and temporalizing, which is what Heidegger means when he says that Dasein is time itself. Here the inquiry into care is explained: “In what sense is the structure of being of Dasein — care — characterized by time? These structures are not different to what they themselves are, neither as time nor as something of a relation to time, but rather care is in a way determined ‘through’ time, in the sense that it is itself time, the facticity of time itself”. There are two further ways in which Heidegger investigates the nothing in relation to Dasein. The first is through the phenomenology of mood, specifically anxiety. The second is in his description of the finitude of Dasein as “being-toward-death”. In Dasein’s being-toward-death Dasein first overcomes the everydayness of being objectified and comes to itself as being for itself. In its finitude Dasein discovers its own Da—, that it is there, the place of its being which is wholly its own. In the phenomenon of anxiety, Dasein most discovers its questionableness, its inability to secure itself against the world. Anxiety is always that mood of being where Dasein discovers itself unable to totalize itself, where its incompleteness as temporal being brings itself before itself as negated, as a not.

Questioning, which appears as a hermeneutical task, is just that possibility of bringing the self to the self as a being, of coming about, of discovering being to be through a particular being, this being, my being. I am most myself when I most discover myself as constituted, given, by what I most am not. Constituted by what? Nothing. Nothing as the ground (which is no-ground) of meaning-giving. Put another way, the very inquiry into ground reveals there to be no ground at all: ground, appearing through groundlessness. This is the factical understanding of myself as given, rather than any causal explanation which I can be given through faith. Nevertheless this groundlessness is the ontological grounding possibility of discovering (in faith) myself to have been created by God. In order truly to discover myself as created (in the order of faith), I must first take myself as groundless (in the order of being). The factical givenness of myself has no explanation, it needs no why, it is the one thing about which I need never ask, but whose meaning is only disclosable in that I alone ask about it. Every asking is a projection into the future, even when the question itself concerns the past. Every causal explanation of this why is a conjecture which might explain but does not expose the structure of this given; every why is an advancing toward, a genuine orientation toward a future, not something which I must discover as already having been. Even Descartes’s argument in the Meditations has this structure, because (in the order of being) the cogito is discovered and grounded first, although this priority is transgressed in what it subsequently discovers already to have been in the order of being. Part of the atheism required to expose this factical understanding is the refusal to adduce causes to my being before understanding what else those causes mean and represent. My very givenness to myself has no cause; it is my being, my Dasein. It is the one thing which, however I explain it, will not yield its meaning through this explanation.

What is at issue here is the carrying through of a critique of Descartes. If the order of procedure of the analytic of Dasein is reversed with regard to Descartes, this is the abandonment, philosophically, of any attempt to ground the self in God as the prior cause of the self. I can find no cause for myself prior to myself, because in the order of being, even something which (say, through faith) I subsequently discovered to have caused me (say, God), nevertheless is a subsequent discovery.

### The Question of Analogy

Having clarified, albeit briefly, some of Heidegger’s concerns with regard to atheism in the phenomenological analysis of Dasein, I raise in a preliminary way, solely as a problem, the question of analogy, which I will consider again in more depth in chapter 6, precisely because of the way it also relates to...
Descartes for Heidegger. In what follows, I wish only to outline the problem as Heidegger prepares it in Sein und Zeit, and only insofar as it refers to Heidegger’s atheism. Descartes’s consideration of the world as res extensa and Aristotle’s understanding of place, τὸ ποικ., lie outside the concerns of this book (as I have noted), although any thoroughgoing treatment of the question of analogy in relation to Heidegger’s work would also have to take them extensively into consideration.

Descartes is able to found the whole of being (substantia finita) on God (substantia infinita) for three reasons: first, because, as I have already noted, for Heidegger, Descartes evades the question of the interrogability of being; second, Descartes founds the whole of created being on incease being, the being of God; and third, however, and most importantly, and despite the turnabout of prior philosophical thinking that his fundamental position represents, Descartes founds modern metaphysics in the way he does only because the inherent possibility of doing so already lay with Aristotle. These three matters conspire to bring the question of analogy to the fore as a seeming solution to the problem of being insofar as modern theology makes an appeal through modern metaphysics to speaking of God. What appears as so appealing a solution is in fact the incapability of modern metaphysics to resolve the question of being at all, which means its inability to make the self, the ‘I’, questionable in its very structures. The suggestion in Sein und Zeit is that the problem of analogy would have to be destructured to its very roots in order properly to undertake a phenomenological description of Dasein. From the point of view of Heidegger’s atheism, this would mean that speaking of God would undergo a certain transformation, one which did not entangle God in the view of Heidegger’s atheism, this would mean that speaking of God would entail a phenomenological description of "Dasein." From the point of view of Heidegger’s atheism, this would mean that speaking of God would undergo a certain transformation, one which did not entangle God in the structures of Dasein, where the mark of this entanglement is that the structures of Dasein appear to be worked out through a question concerning God.

Herman Philipse suggests that a major part of Heidegger’s critique of Aristotle’s understanding of being as such is that “even though Aristotle’s ontology aimed at raising the question of being, he did not succeed in doing so because he reduced the being of entities to yet another entity, the Deity”.

Certainly Heidegger’s description of the relation of the divine to the modes of ἄληθεύειν worked out in the Nicomachean Ethics shows how Sophia, for Aristotle, is the highest mode of ἄληθεια. Σοφία is primarily the mode of being of the divine ("κτήσις, of a "θεός,") and by implication therefore not determined as properly a mode of being of Dasein. Heidegger notes that the working out of the divinity of σοφία, by which all the modes of ἄληθεύειν then fall into an ordering structure, makes the gods—divinity itself—into a philosophical thematic and so is “a very early anticipation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics”. Heidegger immediately adds a footnote to the printed text, pointing the reader to the place in the Metaphysics where Aristotle’s understanding of the divine is laid out: "We hold, then, the divine is a being, living, without change, the best; and therefore life and unceasing ages and unanchoredness are proper to the divine”.

Because Sophia is determined as properly the mode of divinity, all the other modes of ἄληθεύειν (τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φροντίς, and νοῦς) are transformed so that they become dependently modes of divinity too, because they constitute a framework by which divinity and nondivinity (mortality) are coordinated. The whole structure of ἄληθεια in the understanding of human being is simultaneously not worked out on the basis of being-human but being-divine. This has far-reaching consequences for philosophy, in that it represents, from the very beginning, a reversal in the order of working out of the being of beings, the ontological difference itself. From the outset, in other words, the being of beings is worked out on the basis of a being which is not the being of Dasein, but of something else, the divine, or what we now call God.

It is possible to see, therefore, how Heidegger interpreted Descartes, not as making the fundamental move to determine the being of beings out of the divine, but rather, through an intensification of a Christianizing process begun in the Middle Ages, of converting an ontological dependence on the divine already established in Aristotle to its most extreme possibility, which (on the basis of philosophy’s taking over something preferred by faith in revelation) is the possibility demanded by the interpretation of the being of the world (and of human being) as "ens creatum.

The problem of analogy arises, therefore, from "Aristotle, in whom this problem is foreshadowed in prototypical form just at the outset of Greek ontology" and is worked out in varying ways in the theology of...
Scholasticism. Frequently Heidegger reminds his readers that Descartes worked out his ontology on the basis of the categories laid down and investigated by the tradition of Scholasticism.64 Indeed, Heidegger remarks: “With regard to the working out of this problem ontologically, Descartes remains always far behind the Scholastics”.65

In the problem of analogy the signification ‘being’ is taken to be capable of signifying any particular beings with which one may be concerned. Thus “in the assertions ‘God is’ and ‘the world is’ we assert being”.66 However, in this asserting of being, the being of human being has already been referred in its fundamental ontological properties to something other than the human being or Dasein. Analogy arises as a solution to this problem, in that it appears to make transparently possible the signification of the being of all beings, including God. Heidegger’s point is this: Dasein is the being who is properly concerned with being as such, being is an issue for it. This makes the being of beings and above all the being of Dasein interrogable, capable of being questioned: above all, I can inquire into the character and ways of my own being. When, however, the being of beings is determined no longer by and out of the being for whom its being is an issue, being is, strictly speaking, no longer interrogable.

Put another way, God’s self-questioning or even God’s self-transparency philosophically are no concern of mine, because they can never be a concern of mine. As Aquinas tirelessly reminds us, God alone knows God in God’s self. We only know God in God’s effects. If God is made the determinant of the interrogability of the being of beings, then human beings would depend for their knowledge of being on revelations from God. When this is thematized in a formal, philosophical way, something like the cogito would have to emerge, because every cognition now becomes a revelation from God. Thus not only is the meaning of being left unclarified in modern metaphysics, but the way into clarifying it—by questioning, the self-questioning of Dasein as the inherent possibility of the interrogability of being, is blocked off. The cogito doubts—questions—absolutely everything except itself. There is a corollary to this, one that will be decisive for the conclusions of this book. If God’s self-transparency can never be a philosophical concern of mine, in what ways can I be concerned with it? Does faith have an access to this self-transparency, and if so, how?

In virtue of a possibility initiated by Aristotle and thematized in an extreme form by Descartes, in saying ‘God is’ within the province of metaphysics, such a saying already presupposes the occlusion of the being of Dasein: the being of Dasein has not been determined out of its own self-questioning and bringing of itself to the fore, and so it is no longer free to come across other things that are. Analogy is the very marker of this occlusion, or as Heidegger refers to it in the text we consider in chapter 6, an impasse.

Theology as the Science of Faith

It has remained a persistent question what Heidegger meant, in Sein und Zeit and elsewhere, by the terms Eigentlichkeit, eigentlich, Uneigentlichkeit, and uneigentlich. Both Stambaugh’s and the Robinson and Macquarrie translations of Sein und Zeit render these terms as authenticity/authentic and inauthenticity/inauthentic. Heidegger’s introduction of the terms in Sein und Zeit comes with a warning for their difficulty:

As modes of being, authenticity and inauthenticity—these expressions have been chosen in the strictest sense of the word—are based on the fact that Dasein is in general determined by mineness. However, the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a “lesser” being or “lower” degree of being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity when busy, excited, interested, ready for enjoyment.67

64. See, for more contemporary investigations of this relation: Janowski, Z., Cartesian Theodicy (2000); Secada, G., Cartesian Metaphysics: The Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (2000); and Des Chene, D., Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (1996).
These two terms can better be translated as ownliness/ownly and disowned-ness/disowned if only because, while accurately rendering the Greek sense of Ἱε-μείνης, to which Heidegger alludes (as well as all the German resonances of eigen), yet to the English-speaking ear the word authentically does not stress sufficiently the particularity of selfhood in what is meant by je-meinig, my-own.

It was the very working through of this coming-to-the-self of facticity in the period from 1919 up to and just beyond the publication of Sein und Zeit (in fact up to the inaugural lecture for Heidegger’s professorial chair at Freiburg in 1929, Was ist Metaphysik?) that enabled Heidegger to demonstrate the extent to which theology itself had become inauthentic—literally, had disowned and become dissociated from its roots. John van Buren quotes from Heidegger’s winter semester lectures of 1919–20 where Heidegger says that:

The ancient Christian achievement was distorted and buried through the infiltration of classical science into Christianity. From time to time it reasserted itself in violent eruptions (as in Augustine, in Luther, in Kierkegaard). Only from here is Medieval mysticism to be understood . . . [after Augustine] the struggle between Aristotle and the new “feeling for life” continued in Medieval mysticism and eventually in Luther.\

He notes that in the same lecture course Heidegger called for the “destructuring of Christian philosophy and theology”. Van Buren has demonstrated with great effectiveness the way in which Heidegger’s reading of Augustine, the mystical tradition (especially Eckhart), and the early Luther in his lecture courses of 1919, 1920, and 1921, illustrated the extent to which Christianity had delivered itself over into an alien thinking: “To use Heidegger’s terminology in his 1919 course, the Greek conceptuality of the Patristic and Scholastic periods brought about a ‘theorizing’ of primal Christianity and more particularly a designifying, deworlding and mytholo-

gizing of its concrete historical content-sense”. The result, in Scholasticism especially, is that “the believer/God relation is forced into the foreign Aristotelian notion of ‘theion’, the divine, as first cause and ‘noesis noesos, thought of thought’ . . . (which) ‘does not have the slightest thing to do with the God of Thomas’”.70

It is from this background that the 1927 lecture published as Phänomenologie und Theologie has to be understood, with its opening refusal to discuss philosophy and theology as an opposition, while at the same time trying to bring into discussion the question of their relation. Heidegger explicitly clarifies what the object of the ontic science of theology is: not God, but rather, “theology is the science of faith”. This is so in four ways: first, not as a set of propositions; second, as a believing comportment toward revelation; third, because it arises out of faith; and fourth, because theology as an objectification of faith has no other purpose than to advance faith. This ontic science has only to do with an investigation into faith, which is a way of being of Dasein. It is in no sense concerned with a disclosure of the essence of God or of God’s being as such, but only my being in its comported faithfulness to God. Why this should be so important will become clear in my consideration of esse in chapter 6.

A term which Heidegger employs in this discussion and which has the potential to be very confusing is pre-Christian. One is apt to think of the pre-Christian as what occurs before Christ’s coming, or to interpret all time subsequent to the birth of Christ as Christian time. For Heidegger, however, the question of the pre-Christian is entirely related to faith and so not to any universal time but my time, the time of this Dasein. The pre-Christian is therefore what is before my human existence’s faith in Christ. This in Christian terms might be inferred to have two moments—as prior to baptism (or conversion) and prior to formation as a Christian person. It may even have a third moment as that structure of existence which makes conversion possible, which might bear conversion, baptism, or being-in-Christ. Such a figuration is included in the subsequent life of faith: “So it is part of the Christian happening of rebirth that therein a pre-faithful, that is, unfaithful (unbelieving) existence of Dasein is sublated . . . in faith is the

existential-ontic pre-Christian existence indeed overcome . . . ‘overcome’ does not mean disposed of, but possessed in a new way”.

In the same lecture ontology is envisaged as acting as a corrective to the ontic sciences, among which must be included theology: “Ontology functions therefore only as a corrective of the ontic, and to be precise, the pre-Christian content of theological basic-concepts . . . here one must note this correction is not grounding”. Ontology here therefore does not mean some generalized science, some abstract knowledge which, suitably clarified and so clarifying, can ground anew a whole theoretical or abstract theology. Ontology is just that being of knowing which, as knowing, brings me to ‘be’ myself for myself for the first time. Ontology is just that coming to the self which is yielded by the hermeneutics of facticity; it is Dasein coming to itself as an entity, a being, in questioning, owning itself, becoming authentic. Such an ontology is not grounding, because it is already ungrounded—it comes about through taking into understanding the violent plunge into nothing. It is possible to see how Heidegger developed the strongly existential language that characterized Sein und Zeit and yet also how it was that Sein und Zeit was itself so little understood. Is there not, after all, a danger here—precisely that danger which misled Heidegger’s earliest critics into believing him to be advancing a decisionism or voluntarism or existentialism, where I can will myself to be authentic? Is this questioning which gives Dasein to itself as a being something I can just decide to do? Is not this strong existential language nothing other than the existentialism that Heidegger always repudiated as a creation above all, of Sartre?

How can this investigation be characterized, this question which brings me before myself in concern, or care, for the first time, and which in doing so throws up the need for that coming to the self which entails and demands a destruction of philosophy and theology to its roots, as just that destructuring of those very things which first brought me to myself? In 1919 Heidegger introduced a term which was prescient for any understanding of die Kehre, the turn. Specifically discussing the character of hermeneutics, he made the observation “through tipping-over of understanding and appearance (application of negation?) phenomena come to expression. Philosophical intuition is not then the most adequate if it reproduces happenings”. The term tipping-over is repeated in a lecture series of 1925–26, specifically in relation to Kant. If, as von Herrmann suggests, this term is the origin of the term die Kehre, it is specifically so in relation to the understanding of phenomena themselves. In other words, the tipping-over which must always be a possibility for philosophy (i.e., when it becomes a questioning) also occurs as a question about the what and how of knowing phenomena—things. A turnabout—a tipping-over—in the order of thinking will have profound consequences for the understanding of phenomena or beings.

If tipping-over is prescient of die Kehre, still more so is Heidegger’s naming of phenomenological research as an atheism, which belongs intimately to die Kehre when it is fully elaborated. So far, I have traced two parallel movements, albeit briefly. Each functions as a preliminary indication—a hint, perhaps, of how die Kehre will come to be understood, in an understanding to be elaborated in the later chapters of this book. The first revealed Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein to be grounded in the nothing. The second culminated in just that clarification sought when, as Gadamer notes, Heidegger’s question for theology can be formulated as “whether there was no more appropriate way for Christians to understand themselves than the way offered by contemporary theology”. Gadamer’s conclusion here is of particular importance, for it demonstrates well how Heidegger’s project of destructuring is required both in the fields of philosophy and theology: “that the theology, which he had studied and which found its support in
Aristotle’s metaphysics did not correspond in the least bit to the true motives of Greek thinking must have been sharpened by his exchange with this thinking.” If the theology he had studied did not correspond to what he had come to learn was the Greek understanding of being, neither did this theology correspond to what I have described as reflection on the lived experience of faith. His study of St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Luther pointed toward a destructuring purgation of the matter of theology; his study of Aristotle (and through Aristotle, Plato), in contrast, pointed to the need for a destructuring of philosophy. The destructuring at issue would reveal both philosophy and theology in their originary grounds.80

The Meaning of Heidegger’s Atheism

When Heidegger said that philosophical research is and remains atheism he described that research as new. This philosophical research is, therefore, phenomenology, a new and changed field in the procedures of philosophical research. This new research is, he tells us, explained “out of the retrospective and past situation of philosophy”.81 In this sense, philosophical research is now and will remain atheism but was not always so. Already the question of what philosophical research is can be shown as belonging to a historical unfolding, something that has come to pass in a particular form in consequence of what it was before and where it came from. Heidegger is, however, arguing that phenomenology is in its very self-descriptiveness atheistic. Why is this so? Further on, Heidegger says of philosophy: “And precisely in this atheism (it) becomes what a great man once called the ‘Gay Science’”.82

The capitalization of Fröhliche explains who the great man is—Nietzsche, in whose Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft is to be found the story of the madman’s proclamation of the death of God. Phenomenology, this atheism, can and does come about only after Nietzsche and what he has to say about the proclamation of the death of God.

At this point, about the only meaning for the word atheism that can be ruled out, as Vycinas pointed out above, is that Heidegger was or is what is meant by the commonplace term an atheist. What is clear is that in 1925, long before the lectures on Nietzsche of 1937–44 (where, it is commonly understood, Heidegger first elaborated his understanding of the history of being) and before the so-called turn out of the existential analytic of Dasein toward the meaning of being as such, Heidegger was already unfolding the place of God in the context of a historical inquiry into what he himself constitutes as the philosophical tradition, precisely because Nietzsche had proclaimed the death of God. In other words what it is routinely claimed he is doing in the later, wartime, and postwar work (as against his earlier work), he is already doing in outline even before the publication of Sein und Zeit.83

What does this mean? Immediately, there is no later Heidegger as opposed to the earlier (and so by implication, no hermeneutic turn from the structural analytic of Dasein to the analysis of being as such) as far as what later has conventionally been taken to indicate. Moreover, as I intend to show, the terms that are later fully named and worked out as das Ereignis and die Kehr and the philosophical positions that they indicate are already, as early as 1919 and certainly by 1925, working as directives in his thinking.

How might this atheism be understood? This question might better be asked: how is the self (subject) normally grounded? As we have seen, in modern metaphysics the self as subject is either simply taken to be caused by God or discovered to be causally grounded by God, subsequent to the self-grounding maxim cogito ergo sum. Here both God and the self occur apart from the world.

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80. In his lectures on Plato in the winter of 1924/25, Heidegger stressed that the way into Plato was through Aristotle (see Platon: Sophistes [GA19], esp. pp. 12–14).


82. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs [GA20], p. 110. “Und gerade in diesem Atheismus wird sie zu dem, was ein Großer einmal sagte, zur ‘Fröhlichen Wissenschaft.’”

83. An example of this can be found in Michel Haar’s “Critical Remarks on Heidegger’s Reading of Nietzsche” in Macann, C. (ed.), Critical Heidegger (1996 [1995]) pp. 121–133. Haar suggests that Heidegger’s elaboration of Nietzsche as a negative theologian is in consequence of the Nietzsche lectures after his analysis there of the Eternal Return and the Will to Power. In similar vein John Caputo traces Heidegger’s opposition to Catholic students in Freiburg to his becoming an “enthusiastic reader of Nietzsche” while simultaneously putting aside “Kierkegaard, Aristotle, and Luther”, and proposes a still further shift in the postwar years where Heidegger is said to become “anti-nietzschean” (Heidegger and Theology [1993], pp. 277, 281). I remain unconvinced that Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation underwent these particular alterations.
The Futurity of God

If God as the cause and origin of everything, as the origin of ens creatum, is a production of modern metaphysics, I ask for the first time a question to which I return repeatedly, the question indicated by Heidegger’s atheism: what has God to do with philosophy? When Leibniz announced his principle nihil est sine ratione, nothing is without reason, he announced what might almost be called the high-water mark of metaphysics. Leibniz concludes his thoughts on the principle of sufficient reason with the statement “and this final reason of things is called God”.84 What he rejoiced in, what Galileo, Descartes, and Newton in different ways all wanted as an absolute ground of reason is God. Each in his separate way announced the same thing, not as a proof, but as the presupposition to every proof: in his General Scholium to the third edition of the Principia Mathematica, Newton argues: “This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being”.85 He adds: “He rules all things, not as the world soul, but as the Lord of all, and because of his dominion he is called Lord God Pantokrātōr”.86 Here the transition from the ancient cosmos through to its Christianization is named. Armed with this knowledge the court philosopher and Newton’s theologian Samuel Clarke announced in his Boyle lectures of 1704 that “the being and attributes of God are not only possible or barely probable in themselves, but also strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced mind from the most incontestable principles of right reason”.87 Here again is ample demonstration of the Christianization of God, in the roots of modern physics as well as metaphysics.

Heidegger asks how God got into philosophy “not only in the modern period, but in philosophy as such”.88 In a lecture course from 1942–43 on Heraclitus, Heidegger considers the Greek word τὸ δαίμονιον. He cites a passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics which says: “One says (the thinkers) indeed know the effusive, and so astounding, and thereby difficult and hence in general ‘demonic’—but also unusable, because they do not seek what according to straightforward popular opinion, is useful for humanity.”89 He notes, therefore, that the word demonic here cannot have the meaning to which we have become accustomed, but means rather, the uncanny, something which is neither monstrous nor immense nor minute, but simply that which cannot be measured, calculated, or reasoned about or away; nothing, Heidegger says, that can be “grasped by the fans of the will”,90 but rather the way being itself shines out into the everyday—something so simple that it “belongs so immediately to the ‘canny’91 that it can never be explained on the basis of the familiar”.92 The uncanny—the demonic—

84. von Leibniz, G.W., Principes de la Nature et de la Grace (1954), p. 46/47. “Cette Raison suffisante... cette dernière raison des choses est appelée Dieu.”
88. Identität und Differenz (GA11), p. 46. “Nicht nur in die neuzeitliche, sondern in die Philosophie als solche?”
89. Parmenides (GA54), p. 148. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, vii (1141b7 ff). “καὶ περὶ τὰ μὲν καὶ πέπραματα καὶ χαλέα καὶ δαίμονα εἶλεν αὐτὸς φάσιν, ἀκρίβειας ἐγαίης τούτων ἀγάθῳ στίχῳ. Μαν λέει, τις (die Denker) wissen zwar Überschwengliches und also Erstaunliches und somit Schwieriges und deshalb überhaupt ‘Dämonisches’, aber dies sei auch das Unbrauchbare, weil sie nicht das suchen, was so geradehin nach der Menschen Meinung für den Menschen das Taugliche ist.”
91. In the English dialect sense of the pleasant and familiar, as in ‘he’s a canny lad’. 92. Parmenides (GA54), p. 150. “Was zum Geheuren so unmittelbar gehört, daß es nie aus dem Geheuren erklärt werden kann.”
is therefore what surrounds everywhere and makes possible the familiar, which, before it became familiar was proffered as uncanny. Heidegger proceeds in these lectures to consider that kind of looking which is not what in modern philosophy we would know by intentionality, the being-directed-toward, the gazing-at as a self-direction and self-accomplished activity, but rather the looking that he takes from the Greek verb \( \delta\alpha\iota\omega \), which, he notes, strictly speaking only appears in the medial form \( \delta\alpha\iota\omega \eta \), meaning contemplate, spectate. This ‘looking’ Heidegger describes as a self-pointing, which he relates to his translation of the Greek verb \( \delta\alpha\iota\omega \) as: I point. Thus \( \tau\omicron\delta\alpha\iota\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron \) has to do with a pointing or pointing-out. Such a self-pointing is an indicating of the self with respect to what appears together with it, so that through looking, the one looking also in a sense appears (the verb here is \( \varepsilon\rho\sigma\tau\omega\nu\dot{e}\sigma\nu\beta\eta\iota\nu\), shining forth) and takes up and is as a there, the there that \( \text{Da sein} \) takes up.93 This look, \( \theta\epsilon \alpha \), he says, “is not looking as an activity and act of a ‘subject’, but the arising and coming-toward of the ‘object’ . . . self-pointing”.94

This is the very opposite of God as absolute presence, as being as such, where being is taken as a synonym for full-presence, or where, as Aquinas puts it, God alone is the plenitude of existence.95 Here God is understood as what enters and disturbs presence through becoming, which is not an already, but a coming-into, from-out-of-what-is-ahead. Heidegger shows how the concealed is the basis for what emerges and can be seen and known and that this concealed now speaks. God, or the divine, is therefore to do with world and speaking, \( \lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu \), the speaking which the human being also has. In this speaking the concealed emerges and gives rise to what is unconcealed and so lies present: it belongs to it and yet separates itself and is at work in the presencing and presentedness of everything extant, including myself, indeed, precisely because I encounter myself as also included in this unfolding event.

In metaphysics and in the thinking that flows from the Enlightenment, revelation is excluded or becomes problematic because it must be accounted for within the extantness of everything present, and insofar as immediate presence cannot account for revelation, it must be excluded. Moreover, as I have indicated, revelation has been taken over into the province of metaphysics proper, so that, insofar as it is admitted at all, it is now determined according to reason, the ratio. In contrast, however, here with Heidegger, the opposite is true, and the familiar is and everyday occurs on the basis of the uncanny and unfamiliar and what that points out. This is still unconcerned with revelation, only because in thematizing this looking, we are looking at the looking of ourselves and not at what it is that might be available for us to see, once we have a sense of what it was for the Greeks to look at all. He concludes by saying: “Humanity itself is that being whose particular appointment is to be addressed (in the sense of spoken to) from being itself in such a way that in the self-pointing of humanity, in its looking and in its sight, the uncanny itself, the god, appears”.96 Being is the possibility of being-addressed but not the address itself.

To conclude, therefore, what in thinking through an origin of the way in which God is thought as an absence that looks, that calls me forward in the looking, opens up here an unfolding of the separation of faith and philosophy, by showing how philosophy is concerned with being, but God is simultaneously nothing being and nothing known. Nothing can be said of God’s entering being—until God speaks. Thought in a Christian way, when God speaks, this speaking belongs, not to philosophy, but faith. Thought in a Greek way, the speaking of the gods is the content of the pointing-out. What becomes of issue in philosophy is therefore not a forestalling of the content of revelation, but of its receipt, its being possible, its being received by humanity, and its being understood in its receipt. The content of revelation, the matter of what God says, and so who God is, is reserved alone to faith. \( \text{Da sein} \) does not find God as an always-already, but must wait for God and points itself out to the future in order, in waiting, to know who God is who may speak or flee from \( \text{Da sein} \) or remain silent. When God speaks, this is an event in being. What event means here will be a matter for consideration in what follows.

95. Cf. Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, Ia, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; q. 20, a. 2, resp.